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SHOSUKE T AKEMURA
introd uction
Japanese firms in the semiconductor industry are running very rapidly.
This is rather terrible facet to hitechnology buisiness in US economy, I
guess. The sales share of Japanese firms in US proper come to about
90% and more in specific devices branches. Who could predict this
fantastic situation ? Only a few economists know that the important
competitive factors are cost-dominance, performance-dominance and
demand-dominance. But most of economists have not been able to
illustrate these factors in well-defined way.
It is likely that in economics the meaning of competition is clear-cut.
Because it is an determinant element whether product's price come close
to its marginal cost in such a competitive case. But in practice we are
not able to attribute to only "price = marginal cost" approach. Usually
economist takes perfect competition as an base of economic model
framework, but in real world the basic market structure framework is one
kind of oligopoly with some degree of concentration and price determina-
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tion formula is due to the so-called mark-up principle. A substance of
familiar competition consists in competitive power that is equal to the
meaning of rivalry, but not to that of economic competition. Saying
paradoxically, "too little competition" eq uals to "too large rivalry".
In this paper 1'd like to research some practical differences between
competition and rivalry. Besides I will do it in comparison with US and
Japan in the two semiconductor industries.
§ 1 present industry in cultural complexity
Semiconductor industries are rightly in the war. It seems that the war
is endless. What is it all about ? Many researchers say that visible result
of the long war appears to be self-evident. What happened ? Could we
explain the result in terms of rivalry or competitive power? The problem
is very difficult even for intelligent economists and management scientists
to answer. Why?
The keyword to the answer is rightly In "technology", I believe.
Technology has an dense relation with three vital economic and
managemental points. As I refered above these are three dominance
factors of cost, performance and demand. We can see the difference of
technology structure in two countries, US and Japan. In microscopic
sense, technology is rational and strong base to give competitive power to
entrepreneurs. Strictly speaking technology does not depend on interaction
of demand-supply in market, and it has also no relation with so-called
economic competition. In economic competition any firm can't yet survive
by using their weapons named "new technology". As by invisible
Goddess' Hand every economic merit disappears to zero sooner or later,
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any entrepreneur has fatally not strong incentive to create new
technology. Although he can always decrease production cost by means
of cheap labor cost and transaction cost, they can't always use
technological device driven by necessity. We can research mainly
technological type contributing to cost-dominance and performance-domin-
ance. Gnerally speaking technological advantage leads necessarily to
cost-dominance and performance-dominance. Technology itself doesn't cut
cost dominance, but entrepreneurs' efforts to apply their technology to
their own basic research, product developement and production process
always decrease the cost definitely. That is because for instance R& D
investment is very important feasible strategy. Japanese firms are good at
implementing product developement and production process innovations,
but not creating basic research. This is Japanese technological character,
I guess. Which of them is the most critical ?
An pre-history of this industry tells us the truth in part. For instance, a
market share of Japanese industry in this world IS considerably
changeable on each past ten-years-period, especially in 1970's and 1980's.
I'm afraid most of economists use the term, competition, without knowing
well the real world situation of rivalry. Because rivalry is'nt mere
economic phenomena, it is surely socio-economic and even political one.
To put it shortly, rivalry has close relation with the phenomena of
cultural complexity. A certain scientist at the production spot tells us the
following, that is, if Japanese has a definite target and do it, their
creativeness must be revealed at the best(ll. Europeans and Americans
hate losing their market inter-dependence and dislike to behave according
to the others' ideas. They say that every Japanese has the same kind of
opinion, so he doesn't worry about such a troublesome thing. The basic
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structure of Japanese society looks as if a lot of pebbles are bound by a
very strong lope into one, and they are standing side by side. But
reversely in the european society everyone look like a massive and heavy
stone bound loosely by a thin lope each other. Even though one of them
is to move, the others don't move and are standing still with no
influence. This is true democracy, I think. However things are different in
Japan. As soon as one stone moves, every stone starts to move all
together. This is the meaning of consensus in Japanese customs. In other
words this is way of Japanese-typed cooperation.
'Prof. Morishima, in his book(2), tells us that he had wanted to search
the same Japanese version (as Asiant giant) as M. Weber had analysed
regarding social relations between capitalism and rational spirits in 19th
century's Europian society. Of course his work is merely one tried essay,
but this idea is very much unique and interesting for researcher of
Japanese enterprises. But no matter how eagerly he endevoured to search
the status of Confucianism in Japanese history, I'm afraid his discussion
has a lot of persuasion for me to say the least. In discussing that the
spiritual climate underlying Japanese success in industrial economy, I
wonder how KO and CHU as Confucian spiritual factors are useful for
attacking the theme called "Why Japan succeeded In economic
performance ?". I believe, though we must know there is any relation
between concerned ethical factors and Japanese-typed success, we have
not been able to give a persuasive interpretation to respectful and eager
researchers yet.
-40-
Reconsideration: Competition, Rivalry and Firm System 41
§ 2 backgrounds of competitive oligopoly
Though competitive oligopoly is a type of economic homogeneous
oligopoly, its concept includes many parts which can't be explained by
help of orthodox economic theory. Besides the business proper is one
whose match is ruled by price-cutting and R& D action. In modern times
the related enterprises are compelled to implement their own strategies in
the global and border-full business strategy world, in order to increase
their own market share of sales(3).
The minority of economists believe that the essence of oligopoly
consists in non-price competition. By the by it seems that above
price-cutting is a factor of price competition. In fact that is not wrong.
But strictly speaking the core of a problem doesn't insist in price-cutting
but cost-cutting (namely, cost-economising). So we had better consider an
interrelation between economising cost and R&D action. Which is the
first to do among the two ? Many people must think that suitable
success of R& D action comes to realizing cost-economising. Is that true?
Saying paradoxically, I dare to say cost-relevant success plays an
important role as a powerful guide to R&D action, for example, R&D
investment. We need to notice that specially in the semiconductor
industry we cannot tell rightly the difference between price-cutting
induced by cost-economising and by mismatch of demand-supply
relations. Indeed in the case of the latter the price is apt to fall more
rapidly than in that of the former. Of course the former is in our main
interest. In the concerned industry percentage of non-bad articles
(so-called BUDOMARI in Japanese) has a large influence upon cost-cutt-
ing. Expanding on that situations, it is very important how many pieces
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of chips engineeres can get from a piece of wafer. And the most of
technological analysts say the larger piece (in area) of chip they can get,
the worse BUDOMARI they have on a piece of chip. How many pieces
of chips they can cut off is dependent on the ultra-high technology in
this industry. Moderate cost-cutting enables them to sell at lower price,
by which enterprises may add to their own shares of sales, exclusive of
dumping case. This fact induces them to implement larger investment
for R& D and for plant surely and swiftly. In that case "hesitating" is not
forgiven for their own survival, because they have ever learned a vital
lesson from the proverb "Strike while the iron is hot". Specially Japanese
enterprises have implemented an enormous amount of investment even in
the midst of depression. This is a rule patterned by Japanese enterprises.
Most of modern economists used to tell us that in the period of
Japanese high-growth there were a representative competitive oligopoly in
the automobiles and home-electronics industries which the growth of
demand is rather high. The characteristic in point was that we could see
declining price in the long-run with the rise of productivity. This type of
oligopoly which I dare to call oligopoly in rivalry here, is apt to have
cosiderably high seller's degree of concentration, but to change frequently
the order of rate of share in the market. As each producer has continued
to win large merits coming from economy of scale and technological
innovation, he faces to a kind of complex rivalry in respect of capital
formation for plant and R& D and even price formation. Speaking from
specific cycle in semiconductor industry and the like, the price declines
periodically and often radically but not in the long run. Of course as if
the price declines sharply, it can not be under the competitive lowest
level. There must be reason for it. This is a kind of high technological
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barrier for entry coming from product differentiation proper. Therefore a
change in the rate of share is rather small and the concerned makers are
able to keep up a large rate of profit on the average.
The basement of economic action is no doubt market economy. Market
economy means a mode of economic transaction using market mechanism
and market process mainly and effectively. We have two problems here.
One is whether a certain country in trade can offer any open opportunity
for market transaction to his partners or not. This triggers a clear friction
of incomes between the both countries. The other is how government can
discriminate between system of transaction through market (i. e. market
system) and so-called firm system in carrying out the feasible industrial
policies. In this article we can not afford to go into details of Japanese
industrial policies in particular, but I'm afraid that the present situations
of representative specific industries in Japan (for instance. automobile.
semiconductor in present and HDTV in future) characterizes Japanese
industrial policies themselves on the other hand.
While Japan has developed the strength by means of protectionism In
the help of her government, US has done so by means of free trade In
the help of free enterprise. Now Japan is going to adopt the free trade
policy and US is going to adopt the protectionist policy. Ironically Japan
resulted in having more stronger competitive power and US resulted in
having more weaker one. The above shows us very interesting contrast
between two main capitalist countries. Saying more ironically we can say
the economic connections between US and Japan in the past times, look
like ones between Japan and Asian Nies (especially Korea) in these days.
I cannot help guessing that this fact was caused by admirable trick of
history.
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Let's go back to our original subject, oligopoly in rivalry. The followings
are about characters of rivalry of the concerned industries. The main
difference between competition and rivalry consists in the degree of
attaching an importance to competition of price. Rivalry holds good to
make clear non-price situation. In this kind of situation a pretty high rate
of demand-growth lead up to sharp rivalry of technological development,
whether the kind of intermediate products are by captive method or
non-captive one. The advantage of competitive power used to realize an
experience rule of cost (a kind of learning by doing) as well as a large
economic merit from economy of scale and technological innovation
(process innovation and products innovation) with enormous amount of
investment for plant and R& D. This is such a technological development
war as we cannot even imagine easily. The drastic price-cutting rivalry
follows during the war and after the war as might be expected. In
practice every semiconducter company is an imperfect integrated maker
unlike so-called big steel company with a perfect integrated operation.
Generally speaking a company which vertical integration is highly
organized has surely more productive efficiency. Actually most of
Japanese semiconductor makers are well-integrated and giant general-ele-
ctronic appliances companies. This is noticeable feature of Japanese
companies. Needless to say even Japanese large makers have to buy the
specific production apparatuses and parts from the other excellent family
partnerships. As we know a theory of the comparative advantage in the
integrated organization hasn't been fully understood even among
organizational scientists. A whiskey/beer maker whose main product is
whiskey can invest the part of money earned at the whiskey branch into
the beer branch. In the same wayan electric appliances company whose
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main products are home-electric ones can invest the money earned at the
concerned branch into the semiconductor branch. This is a secret of safe
investment.
What is the theoretical framework explaining this chain of industrial
features ? In summary it seems there are three vital points. The first is
organizational vertical integration. The second is investment for R& D and
plant induced by superior cost performance. The third is strategic rivalry
in terms of share of sales. All of three points are supply side factors.
Besides we must add more three realistic points here. The fourth is what
is something like "barriers to entry" in this industry. The fifth is
probability of cooperative R& D activities founded by several domestic
or/and foreign companies. The sixth is effectiveness of 'industrial
policies' characterlized by MITI (TSUSANSYO) in Japan(4). If we can
safely describe a reliable procedure which coordinates the above SIX
factors, we may make great progress in this industrial research.
§ 3 industrial character seen in the statistical data
At first we will begin with seeing actual situations of the concerned
manufacturing industry in the world. By table T -1, during about 20 years
sales ranking specially between Japan and US changed dramatically.
Table T-2 tells us that during only five years shares of sales between
two countries were turned nicely. This couple of tables show us that US
has allowed Japan to take the lead willy-nilly in this industry. This is a
hard-boiled fact. And the figure 2. 8 (l988) filled in "others" in table T-2
explains symbolic strength of Asian Nies.
According to table T-3 the shares of exports in Japan and Asian Nies
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T-] sales ranking of semiconductor maker (5)
(million dollars)
company ranking (1990) ranking (1971) sales (1990)
NEC OAP.) 1 6 4,952
TOSHIBA OAP.) 2 below]! 4,905
HIDACHI OAP.) 3 7 3,927
MOTOROLA (US) 4 2 3,692
INTEL (US) 5 1 3, ]35
FUJITYU OAP.) 6 below]! 3,019
TI (US) 7 below]] 2,574
MITUBISI OAP.) 8 9 2,476
MATUSITA OAP.) 9 below I ! 1,945
PHILLIPS (EUR.) 10 belowll 1,932
Source: Inq uiry of DATAQUEST INC.
T-2 change of share of sales (in the world)
Japanese Companies
US Companies
European Companies
Others
1983
36.8%
52.4%
10.0%
0.8%
1988
51.0%
36.5%
9.7%
2.8%
Source: Inquiry of DATAQUEST INC.
T-3 change of exports of hi-tech. prod ucts
US
Japan
EC
Asian Nies
Others
1980
30.6%
8.0%
43.5%
4.1%
13.8%
Source: JETRO (1989)
1986
26.4%
15.6%
37.7%
6.1%
14.2%
(including Korea, Taiwan, Singapole and Malasia etc.) have grown while
those of US and EC have reduced.
Table T -4 tells us that the composition of final demand (use) of
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semiconductor is considerably different In character between two
countries. While the weight of government/defence use is 21% in US,
the weight of industrial civil use is only 7% in the same country. In the
case of Japan the situation is just reverse. In automobiles use the
percentage of US is about three times as high as that of Japan.
Next how about applying for patents (technology proper) done in
foreign countries by Japanese scientists?
Table T-5 shows us that the growth of applying for patents done in
US by Japanese scientists is large as compared with the same ratio of
other countries. As no doubt US is much endowed with seeds of
technological ideas and opportunities for economic activities, a field of
economic activities using market powers is still immensely large. That
famous Kilby's patents concerning semiconductor technology became
T-4 comparison: final demand (use) of semiconductor
Japan US
industrial civil use 43% 7%
computers & others 33% 36%
industrial other use 11% 14%
automobiles 3% 10%
goverment/ defence 0% 21%
Source: Inquiry of EIAJ/WSTS (1989)
T-5 change of applying for patents by Japanese scientists
in US
in Germany
in UK
In France
in Switzerland
1975
8.5%
7.2%
6.8%
6.0%
4.1%
Source: Inquiry of WIPO
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20.3%
13.6%
13.9%
13.9%
6.9%
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old-fashioned now, but most of Japanese semiconductor makers using his
patents for their own products are paying a large sum of the patent fee
yet. While the rate of applying for patents by Japanese scientists is
increasing now, the above fact IS even an inevitable troublesome
weakpoint for Japanese technology.
Diagram D-I shows us a ratio of ravenue and expenditure (divided
exports by imports in terms of trade of technology). The level of US is
absolutely high comparing with that of Japan now(6). But while the ratio
of US is decreasing, that of Japan is increasing. The above is a symbolic
fact, whether we like our notorious technology originated from imitation
or not.
D-I ratio of exports/imports in terms of technology
logarithm
100
20
10
2
0.2
0.1
n
ys
-.[]
.'
. . .- -.
~ ~
....-""> -..../
/ JAPAN
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 year
Source: Economic White Paper (in 1991)
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§ 4 scale of investment for plant and prIce change
The above facts mentioned as statistical data are especially interesting
for us. But even if these things tell us an material of industrial decline in
US, they aren't the vital matters in discussing competitiveness or 'rivalry
of the concerned industry. What can we do on this occasion?
I am much interested in a so-called product cycles mechanism. This
mechanism teaches us that product innovation is more important strategic
factor than production process innovation. I believe we can win more
valuable theory through modifiing somewhat the original version of this
theory. In the case of semiconductor industry an interval of the concerned
product cycle is extremely short. It is said that the cycle period is three
or four years. For instance DRAM market has a specific pattern that its
cycle might to dash into the declining-period as soon as four years pass
Since the manufacturing makers declare selling this product. And the
degree of integration used to become four times what it was every three
years(7) The integrated degree is the higher, the larger amount of
investment for plant is needed. In fact total sum of investment in this
branch is just like astronomical figures.
Table T -6 shows us the sum of investment for plant about ten makers
in the world. There are two big mountains in 1984 and 1990. In 1987
there is a bottom. The sum of investment in 1984 is larger than that in
1990. About in 1984 the big makers began to set regular mass-prod uction
of 256k (DRAM) product. In 1990 they began to set regular mass-produc-
tion of 4M (DRAM) product. The beginning year of regular mass-produc-
tion of 1M (DRAM) product is in 1987, but the sum of investment for
plant is considerably small in comparison with the other two beginning
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T-6 sum of investment for plant
(hundred millions yen)
company (1984) (1987) (1990)
NEC (JAP.) 1,400 400 1,050
TOSHlBA (JAP.) 1,480 700 1,050
HIDACHI (JAP.) 1,300 400 950
FUJITYU (JAP.) 1,310 400 1,000
MITUBISI (JAP.) 700 160 690
MATUSITA (JAP.) 1,100 220 730
(millions dollars)
MOTOROLA (US) 320 650
INTEL (US) 300 670
TI (US) 210 760
SGS-TOMSON (EUR) 190 230
Source: Inq uiry of PRESS JOURNAL INC.
years of mass-production. In short we can guess that the methods of
production of 256k (DRAM) and 4M (DRAM) needed necessarily true
epock-making and break-through technological innovation. Might the
technology of 1M (DRAM) be something improved one as compared with
the case of 256k (DRAM), as if it is an epoch-making technological
innovation ?
If that is true, a certain break-through technology may come every six
years. In adapting this cycle we can estimate that the magnification of
large scaled integration become sixteen times. By very simple extrapolati-
on we may be able to guess that a regular mass-production using the
next coming break-through technology will appear in 1996 on this 64M
(DRAM) product. Probably the regular mass-production of 16M (DRAM)
product will start in 1993 without so mountainous investment for plant.
Price change of each specific DRAM product is in close relation with
each stage of the past three epock-making technological innovation.
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Diagram D-2 shows us that prices of four kinds of DRAM products
including 64k (DRAM) are considerably changeable. We can observe that
acute falling of the old product's price took place, very soon after the
mass-production of the new product owing to epock-making technological
innovation began.
Diagram D-3 shows prospect of each DRAM demand in the world. And
can see that in nearly two years after the vivid demand of the new
product appeared, the common demand of old product began to
decrease.
As a semiconductor chip is the ultimate element in a sense. Therefore
the type of market structure is homogeneous oligopoly. As it were it is
the same kind of timber or iron frame industry. Can we say these
features of market structure with satisfaction?
Generally speaking we find that a maker considers two factors in order
to acquire his own advantage of competitive power. One is cost
structure, the other is product differentiation. The former is price-typed,
physical and subjective factor, the latter is nonprice-typed (brand-typed),
psychological and objective one. We can write out the following formula
here.
price = f (cost, return of investment)
brand = g (sales, rate of share)
Price is explained by cost and return of investment (RO!). Brand is
explained by sales and rate of share (ROS). While the first price formula
is written with the help of "average concept", the second one is written
with the help of "total concept". While "innovational technology" is the
engine which connect cost with return of investment in price formula,
"specific performance" is that which connect sales with rate of share. In
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0-2 price change of each DRAM product
logarithm
10
4M __\.
1980 1984 1987 1990 year
Source: Inquiry of OATAQUEST' INC.
0-3 prospect of DRAM demand in the world
(hundred millions pieces)
60~---------------------,
4M
(64K)
'"
20 1-------:--:-::-::------:7""'=:----Jf------------i
40 I--------------~~--___l
year1989 1990 19911987
oL...,:::::::::::::=------T""===::::::::=::-,.=::::::;;.......-:;::=::::=----I
1985
Source: Inquiry of DATAQUEST INC.
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the semiconductor industry "innovational technology" is above-mentioned
break-through technology and "specific performance" IS height of
integration, for instance, named 64M (DRAM). Because price multiplied
by quantity is sales, we may say that price has influence with brand
indirectly. But true logical relation between price and brand hasn't
elucidated as yet.
Though such building materials as timber or iron frame are indispens-
able to build houses, we don't notice that there are break-through
technology in those industries. Besides we don't know that they made an
immense cost of advertisement in order to promote the degree of
differentiation. It is likely that there are a certain specific homogeneous
oligopoly in the semiconductor industry.
To be sure the final purpose of 'going concern' is growth of firm,
whether its content is growth of sales or is extension of share or is
long-run maximization of profit. But there are four effective properties
which Japanese firms have and American firms have not. Two of them
are diversification (= non specially occupied in only production of
semiconductor product) and skills (= Japanese-typed internal labor
situations and man power training). The others are management
(= Japanese specific management, for instance, long-run sighted manager
and managers' close friendship with workers) and affiliation (= KEIRETU
in Japanese: specific transactios among Japanese groups of firms, for
instance, HIDACHI group or MATUSHITA group etc.).
Taking so-called 'purposeful systems theory' favorably, there are three
concepts which construct a counterpart of firm system. They are
structure, function and purpose(S). Structure relates to firm's actions. It
contains cost, price, brand, investment and the like as system's element.
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Function relates to firm's outcomes. It contains the above four effective
properties and advantage of competitive powers (rivalry) including
structure itself as a functional subsystem. Environment of a system is a
set of elements and their relevant properties which elements are not part
of the system.
Table T-7 shows us classes of structure & function in question. In
this table MULTI-MULTI in the column means "different structures In
the same and different environments". UNI-UNI (A.) in the row means
"one function in all environments". UNI-MULTI (B.) means "one function
in anyone environment, different functions in some different environme-
nts". MULTI-MULTI (C.) means "different functions in the same and
different environments". And the above each entries are named, in order,
"ACTIVE FUNCTIONAL", "ACTIVE MULTIFUNCTIONAL", and
"ACTIVE DOUBLE-MULTIFUNCTIONAL".
"SINGLE PROGRAM" means "only market mechanism and process"
and "MULTI PROGRAM" means "market mechanism and non market
mechanism and process". "ULTIMATE PROGRAM" means "more
1'-7 <classes of structure & function>
structure function of outcomes
of
actions A. UNI-UNI B. UNI-MULTI C. MULTI-MUL1'1
ACTIVE ACTIVE ACTIVE
FUNCTIONAL MULTIFUNCTIONAL DOUBLE-
MULTIFUNCTIONAL
MULTI- SINGLE MULTI PROGRAM ULTIMATE
MULTI PROGRAM SEEKING PROGRAM
SEEKING SEEKING
only (US TYPE) (JAPAN TYPE) (JAPAN TYPE
in future)
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elaborate version of MULTI PROGRAM".
The last section of this article shows us what Japanese firm system IS
from the viewpoint of so-called purposeful system.
§ 5 conclusion: rivalry in semiconductor industry
Summing up the special features of semiconductor product or
semiconductor industry, we can list the following seven features. The 1'st
is that it is the ultimate element out of which almost all modern
hi-technology products are made. The 2'nd is that In the semiconductor
industry the technological goal to attain is evident to persons concerned
from the first. The 3'rd is that instead it hasn't a so-called clear-cut
brand image of products, the size of demand depends solely on
technology concerning the degree of integration. The 4'th is that in this
industry an immense amount of investment for plant must be carried out
In order to compete with height of integration in intense rivalry. The 5'th
IS that this industry has a great mass production effect (so-called
experience effect) to induce price to fall somewhat. The 6'th is that the
concerned world-wide top ranking makers are used to producing a lot of
general electro-systematic products including from various kinds of
semiconductor devices to radio cassette recorder. The Tth is that there is
a periodicity of every three years in demand change whether the
producer likes it or not.
Because of the above seven situations, global business partnership
between the same kind of makers is rising in order to complete joint
R& D research. This is an effective policy for which the concerned
makers decrease their own risk and cost in huge productive investment.
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In the near future a handful makers can tide over the keen rivalry and
survive through only their reciprocal cooperative partnership. The fresh
game between rivalry and partnership has just begun in search of an
opening in the advantage of competitive power in the concerned
industry. In other words they have just begun to grope for "ULTIMATE
PROGRAM" in the above-mentioned table.
{purposeful firm system)
(purpose)
(function)
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE POWERIRIVALRY)
(structure)
COST DOMINANCE
j--------- - - ---------,
• INNOVATIONAL :
• TECHNOLOGY:
.... - - - I
PERFORMANCE
DOMINANCE
rs-PE6FIC' ---- ----:
: PERFORMANCE'1._- .. '
DEMAND DOMINANCE
(COST STRUCTURE) (PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION)
DIVERSIFICATION ISKILLS IIMANAGEMENT II AFFILLATION I
ENVlRONMENT
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NOTES
(1) See for instance Warshofsky [1989].
( 2) See Morishima [1984].
( 3) See Kagono et al [1983] and Keizai Hakusyo [1990].
(4) See for instance Okimoto [1989] and Okimoto & others [1985].
(5) Comparing growth of sales between US and Japan in 1990-91, US is higher by 4
points than Japan (including only top ten makers).
US
Japan
sales (1990) sales (1991)
(million dollars)
9, 401 10, 727
21, 224 23.335
rate of growth
(%)
14
10
Source: Inquiry of DATAQUEST INC.
( 6) An overwhelming height of level of US is explained by immense amount of
patent fee for basic technology proper. "Intellectual property rights" is a coming hot
problem.
( 7) A representative silicon-cycle mechanism is the followings.
It is said that the literal silicon-cycle doesn't apply in recent trend.
the ratio (in the same period) of the year to last year
-- production of semiconductor--
(DRAM)
14.5 %
forecast
4M 16M
---..
1M256KIK%
100 -
80
60
40
20 m7I--'=----l<;77777j---ii7,77;-rT~-----;?iw;;r-_m777]rv7lr_=~7777.7772~=_
O~;;r----1~;qj---+"'(JJL-+---t__=_+_-_H:~(JJi.'_+_-PW_-+__­
-20
-40
8.4%
i j iii j
197172 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 year
Source: Japanese Mechatronic Industrial Society (1988)
(8) See Ackoff & Emery [1972]. But there are my personal views here.
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